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Abstract
We investigate how the term ‘trust’ has been used, and re-defined, in computer security, covering
Trusted Computing Platforms, Trust Management, Trusted Computing, and Trusted Code. We
conclude that trust is a dangerous word to use as it has manifold and sometimes contradictory
meanings. There is no immediate problem when trust is used in a specific research area to denote
some concept of interest. Difficulties arise when interfacing between communities that use this
word differently, and with the general public which is unlikely to associate a word like trust with
any specific technical definition adopted in a field of research.
Keywords: Access control, security policies, trust, trusted code, trusted computing, trust
management.
1 Introduction
IT security has been described as a fashion industry. The latest ‘security tech-
nology’ is bought because everybody else is doing the same (a.k.a. following
best practice), but not because there has been a proper assessment of its actual
merits, which admittedly can be difficult. Similar phenomena can be observed
in security research. New terms arise, become the topic of research papers,
and are included in calls for research proposals, without a coherent analysis
of what these terms are supposed to stand for. IT also loves anthropomorphic
explanations, such as sending emails or digitally signing documents, that can
give a wrong idea about the service actually provided.
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Today, ‘trust’ is a prime example for such a fashionable anthropomorphic
term. Trust is often regarded as an important precondition for the adoption
of new technologies, and thus as a research problem needing urgent attention.
Several research programs have listed trust as an important item in their calls
for proposals. The goal is to provide technology that can be trusted by its
users. When trust is defined, for example, as the user’s willingness to risk
time, money, and personal data on a website, we are primarily concerned with
user psychology. In this context, trust is a natural term to use. Furthermore,
this type of trust is an important goal indeed when designing and deploying
IT systems. As we shall see, this interpretation does not necessarily match
the various usages of trust in computer security.
We will not try to clarify the meaning of trust; too many different concepts
are labelled with this word to make such an endeavour feasible. Instead, we
will trace the history of ‘trust’ in computer security, identify some new research
areas that express their goals as issues of trust, and try to convince the reader
that it would be to the benefit of many of these research fields if they would
state their agenda without reference to trust. Our investigations will focus on
topics related to access control and to security policies.
2 Trusted Computing Base
When analyzing an IT system, one can identify components that have to work
as expected for the system to meet its advertised purpose. Interpreting trust
in a way that equates trust with expected behaviour, these components could
be called trusted. In other words, a system is trusted (secure?) if there are
no surprises when we use it.
In the early years of computer security, ‘trusted’ was used in this way, de-
noting everything one had to rely on for the system to remain secure. For ex-
ample, the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria [10] define a Trusted
Computing Base (TCB) as
the totality of protection mechanisms within a computer system – including
hardware, firmware, and software – the combination of which is responsible
for enforcing a security policy.
If a trusted component fails, security can be violated. We might want to
have evidence that this cannot happen. In the 1980s, components that came
with such evidence were called trustworthy. In contrast, trusted components
are those that can hurt you. A similar use of the word trust can be found even
earlier in the 1970s. In the Bell LaPadula model [1], trusted subjects are those
subjects exempted from the mandatory security policies. To summarize our
starting point of the history of ‘trust’ in computer security, trusted components
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were those where you had to take on trust that they did not violate your
security policies. For trustworthy components you had reasons to believe that
this would be the case.
3 Trust Management
When the Internet was opened to general use, new paradigms developed in
the way IT systems are used. It became obvious that policy administra-
tion amounts to more than setting access control lists by a single authority.
Equally, policy enforcement amounts to more than checking an access control
list stored with a protected resource. Policies can be encoded as certificates
and policy enforcement may consult multiple policy decision points.
Trust management, as used in PolicyMaker [3] and KeyNote [2] was used as
a term to distinguish a new and more general decentralized approach to access
control from traditional methods that at one time where the only concepts
around and might have been perceived as the essence of access control. (IT
security sometimes suffers from confusing mechanisms with the services they
provide.) We quote from [2]:
Trust management, introduced in the PolicyMaker system, is a unified ap-
proach to specifying and interpreting security policies, credentials, and re-
lationships.
The early papers on trust management had no need to define what they
meant by trust as they did not propose new rationales for defining security
policies, but just a set of new generic mechanisms. Unfortunately, later au-
thors were lured by the term trust management to assume that these systems
provided means for managing trust, inserting their own interpretation of trust
in the process. The dangers inherent in the term trust management have been
acknowledged by one of its creators [5]:
Trust management is supposed to be an incredibly vague and provocative
term invented by Matt Blaze. I don’t know whether he intended it that
way, but it comes natural to him
Decentralized access control is an interesting research area, covering topics
such as policy languages, the design of enforcement mechanisms, or credential
chain discovery services. In scenarios where there is no global entity defining
the security policy but where we deal with an amalgamation of local policies
defined by different entities, and where there are various ways of delegating
(granting) access rights, we face a difficult task when defining the correspond-
ing enforcement mechanisms. ‘Precise’ mechanisms that explicitly handle each
possible case might become unwieldy, if not altogether impossible to design.
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It is then an interesting question whether a generic algorithm would be ac-
ceptable that associates the credentials employed in the access control scheme
with some weighting attribute, which might (in)conveniently be called trust,
and bases fuzzy (or probabilistic) access control decisions on the combined
trust value for the credentials provided (see e.g. [8] for an algorithm for com-
bining such trust values). To deploy such a mechanism, we would have to
justify that the attribute we happen to use does have the properties assumed
by the decision algorithm, and policy administrators have to be guidance on
assigning values for this attribute. In this context, the statement ‘trust is
whatever you want it to mean’ does make some sense, but the research chal-
lenge is not so much the design of new algorithms for manipulating weights
(trust) but to test those schemes in practice.
4 Trusted Computing
Concerns about the lack of security of Personal Computers connected to the
Internet led in 1999 to the foundation of the Trusted Computing Platform
Alliance (TCPA), which was later reconstituted as the Trusted Computing
Group (TCG). The initial goal was to make the Web a safer place for surfers.
The goals have changed and the website of the TCG now states its objectives
as helping users protect their information assets (data, passwords, keys, etc.)
from compromise due to external software attack and physical theft.
A core element in the security architecture developed by the TCG is a set
of so-called roots of trust. The TCG Glossary [7] defines roots of trust as
components that must always behave in the expected manner, because their
misbehaviour cannot be detected. Such a root of trust would be a trusted
component in the sense of section 2. The definition in the glossary continues
with the statement:
The complete set of Roots of Trust has at least the minimum set of func-
tions to enable a description of the platform characteristics that affect the
trustworthiness of the platform.
This makes a leap from trusted components to trustworthiness platforms,
and destroys the careful distinction between trusted and trustworthy systems.
With this interpretation of trust, we have reasons to believe that a trusted
system will work as expected. Through attestation, there is even a mechanism
whereby one can check that a remote system is configured as advertised.
On a technical note, the implementation of the roots of trust strongly relies
on cryptographic mechanisms. The development of novel cryptographic mech-
anisms for trusted computing and the developments of applications that build
on trusted computing modules are interesting research areas. Incidentally, one
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can find discussions of cryptographic applications also outside Trusted Com-
puting where trust stands for certain cryptographic keys, and where trust
establishment mechanisms just amount to a key establishment protocols.
5 Trusted Code
The developments in the use of IT systems alluded to in section 3 have in-
troduced code-based access control, as found in Java [6] or .NET [9], as an
alternative to traditional identity-based schemes. In code-based access con-
trol, access privileges are assigned directly to code, not to users. It has become
customary to refer to code running with many privileges as trusted code and
to code running with very few privileges as untrusted code; for example, code
restricted to a Java sandbox would be untrusted. Semi-trusted code might
have a few more privileges but not the full set of privileges given to trusted
code.
A flaw in code running with systems privileges might be exploited by an
attacker to take over the victim’s system. The same flaw in code that runs
with limited privileges would have less serious implications. In this sense,
trusted = privileged code is indeed a component that can hurt you, fitting
the definition of trust initially adopted in computer security. However, calling
code trusted may also insinuate that this is code you can trust, i.e. trustworthy
code, which can easily lead to confusion.
In code-based access control, improving enforcement mechanisms that are
currently based on a stack walk and the development of design patterns for
the practical use of code-based access control are just two interesting current
research challenges.
6 Policies and Mechanisms
The last remark above raises an important general issue. When deploying an
access control system, we have the policy the system is supposed to enforce
and the mechanisms that make the access control decisions. The mechanisms
tend to be generic, the policies specific to a given application. The rationales
for setting policies may differ and may sometimes relate to trust in a person or
trust in a technology. However, there exist other rationales such as the need-
to-know principle or contractual agreements between cooperating entities.
It is a potential problem when the language used to describe the mecha-
nisms already suggests the rationale for setting a policy. In particular, when
we have trusted code or trusted subjects, one might be led to assume that
these entities have been given access rights because they are trusted in some
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way. Maybe even worse, restricting someone’s access rights could be read
as an indication of a lack of trust (rather than a simple application of the
need-to-know principle).
Consider, for example, a collaborative research project. Project partici-
pants will give members of partner organisations access to resources that are
needed to work on the project, but not to their entire systems. Companies
might even insist that there is a contractual agreement that specifies who will
work on the project at partner organisations and the exact subset of project
data these employees would be allowed to access. In all these decisions, the
necessities of the project will have a dominant influence on the setting of the
policy.
7 Conclusion
There are many reasons why trust is bad for security. First, security needs
clarity and precision. Using a term like trust that has many different meanings
(many more than explored in this paper) is unlikely to promote clarity and
precision. As a point in case, TCBs do not guarantee trust, they ask for it;
trust management does not manage trust but access control; using trust as a
security attribute for access control mechanisms may give wrong ideas about
the rationale for policies. We should thus take our cue from Occam’s razor,
quoted in one of its many variants:
One should not increase, beyond what is necessary, the number of entities
required to explain anything.
In this sense, it is generally a good idea to avoid overloaded terms, and
trust is a much overloaded term indeed. There is, of course, no immediate
problem when a specific research area decides to use trust for denoting some
phenomenon of interest, presuming that is clear to everyone in the area what
this term is supposed to mean. Problems may start when interacting with
other research fields that use the same term, but with a different meaning;
with due diligence it should be possible to be clear about the differences in
the respective definitions so as not to fall into the trap of assuming everybody
means the same as they are using the same word.
There are more serious problems when presenting any of the aspects of
‘trusted’ computing to a general audience. In such conversations, ‘trusted’
means what a reasonable person would understand it to mean, which is un-
likely to match a specific technical definition. Conversely, the precise technical
definition might actually mislead the public.
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Returning to the starting point of this paper, users come to ‘trust’ complex
technologies through experience, not because they understand it. In partic-
ular, many of the advanced access control schemes discussed today in the
context of trust management are unlikely to have any direct impact on user
confidence.
As a final note, our journey through the history of trust in computer
security has touched on many interesting and novel research challenges. This
leads to our last observation on trust. When facing new challenges it often
takes time before the full nature of all its facets becomes clear. At such
times, we need placeholders to keep the discussion going, but eventually those
placeholders ought to be replaced by more precise terms. This situation is
quite typical in security, take for example the reference to ‘good’ keys or the
expression of authentication in terms of beliefs to be found in the BAN logic
[4]. Another example is the ∗-property in the Bell LaPadula model [1] where
the placeholder has survived till today. Trust is just the latest example for
such a placeholder in times of changing security paradigms.
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